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SURVEILLANCE AND THE POLITICAL VALUE OF PRIVACY 
 
Benjamin J Goold∗ 
 
Of all the rights typically enshrined in domestic and international human 
rights instruments, privacy is perhaps one of the most problematic.1 
Although few people would suggest that privacy does not deserve to be 
protected as a right, many nonetheless find it difficult to explain why it 
should enjoy the same status as the right to free speech or freedom of 
religion. As a consequence, while academic lawyers, sociologists, and 
philosophers continue to engage in increasingly rarefied debates about the 
meaning and limits of privacy, for the public at large it remains one of the 
most difficult rights to understand.  
 
Given that the last twenty years has seen a profound expansion in the 
apparatus of surveillance in Europe and North America,2 this continuing 
disjuncture between the level of academic and public interest in privacy is 
deeply worrying. A public that is unable to understand why privacy is 
important – or which lacks the conceptual tools necessary to engage in 
meaningful debates about its value – is likely to be particularly susceptible to 
arguments that privacy should be curtailed. For evidence of this, one only 
has to reflect on how quickly advocates of increased surveillance invoke the 
mantra that ‘those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear.’ Despite 
being deeply flawed, it is an argument that has proved to be remarkably 
effective in countries like Britain and the United States, and one that civil 
libertarians and privacy advocates have had considerable difficulty 
countering. Faced with politicians repeatedly reminding them of the grave 
threat posed by criminals and terrorists, it is hardly surprising that the public 
is attracted to the supposed benefits of surveillance, and left cold by 
arguments rooted in the need to ‘preserve individual autonomy’ or ‘protect 
our dignity.’ 
 
In part, the problem here is one of language. Explaining why privacy is 
important in terms that a lay member of the public is likely to engage with is 
difficult, mostly because privacy is an inherently complex concept. Although 
it is possible to talk of privacy as simply the right to be ‘let alone’,3 its status 
as a right derives primarily from its relationship to ideas of autonomy and 
self-determination. Privacy is valuable because it is necessary for the proper 
                                                
∗ Dr Benjamin J Goold is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Oxford, and Fellow and Tutor in Law 
at Somerville College. He is also a member of the Oxford Centre for Criminology. 
1 A right to respect for privacy and family life is, for example, set out in Article 8(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which states that: “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
2 For an account of the modern expansion in surveillance, see: D. Lyon, Surveillance Society: 
Monitoring Everyday Life, Buckingham: Open University Press 2001. 
3 S.D. Warren and L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review 1890-4(1), pp. 
193-220.  
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development of the self, the establishment and control of personal identity, 
and the maintenance of individual dignity.4 Without privacy, it not only 
becomes harder to form valuable social relationships – relationships based 
on exclusivity, intimacy, and the sharing of personal information – but also 
to maintain a variety of social roles and identities. Privacy deserves to be 
protected as a right because we need it in order to live rich, fulfilling lives, 
lives where we can simultaneously play the role of friend, colleague, parent 
and citizen without having the boundaries between these different and often 
conflicting identities breached without our consent.  
 
Because, however, none of these ideas are easily reduced to newspaper sound 
bites or capable of being adequately conveyed in a televised debate, they are 
not immediately familiar to the public. If asked ‘why is privacy important’, 
the average person on the street is unlikely to suddenly appeal to notions of 
identity and autonomy, and as such may struggle to explain why privacy 
deserves to be protected at all. It is for this reason that many privacy 
advocates have continued to evoke the nightmarish imagery of George 
Orwell’s ‘1984’ in their efforts to get the public to take privacy seriously. 
Aside from the fact that such imagery is both familiar and dramatic, it has the 
advantage of being sufficiently extreme to scare even the most complacent 
individual into at least thinking about the possible implications of 
technologies like CCTV and computerised databases. Yet it can be argued 
that even this rhetorical play is beginning to lose some of its power. As 1984 
slips further into the past and the totalitarian future imagined by Orwell 
continues to remain a fiction rather than a reality, there are signs that such 
warnings are beginning to fall on deaf ears. Although surveillance has 
become ubiquitous, it has also become increasingly decentralised and 
ambiguous. In a world of online shopping, social networking websites, and 
GPS enabled smart phones, it is hard to point to a single Big Brother who 
fully embodies our fears about the loss of privacy and can serve as a focus 
for acts of resistance.  
 
As important as the problem of language may be, however, there is another 
reason why privacy has failed to capture the public imagination. Although 
academics and civil liberties groups have been right to draw attention to the 
importance of privacy to the individual, it can be argued that they have done 
so at the expense of developing a fully realised account of the political value 
of privacy. While it is true that privacy is important for the exercise of 
personal autonomy and the maintenance of dignity, we also need a measure 
of privacy in order to enjoy a range of other, more obviously political rights. 
It is hard to imagine, for example, being able to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, or freedom of religion without an accompanying 
right to privacy. Indeed, one of the greatest dangers of unfettered mass 
surveillance is the potential chilling effect on political discourse, and on the 
ability of groups to express their views through protest and other forms of 
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peaceful civil action. By ensuring that there is a limit on what the state can 
reasonably expect to know about us, privacy not only helps to protect 
individual autonomy, but also ensures that we are free to use that autonomy 
in the exercise of other fundamental rights.  
 
Looked at from this perspective, privacy becomes both easier to understand 
and defend. By focusing on the political rather than the individual dimension 
of privacy, we not only free ourselves from complex discussions of individual 
autonomy and dignity, but also ensure that the relationship between the 
individual and the state remains at the heart of any debate about privacy and 
surveillance. Without privacy, it is much harder for dissent to flourish or for 
democracy to remain healthy and robust. Equally, without privacy the 
individual is always at the mercy of the state, forced to explain why the 
government should not know something rather than being in the position to 
demand why questions are being asked in the first place. Emphasising this 
dimension of privacy also has the advantage of focusing the public’s 
attention on the political dangers of surveillance, dangers that can be 
explained in terms that are familiar and easily understandable, even to those 
who have no great interest in privacy per se. We should resist the spread of 
surveillance not because we have something to hide, but because it is 
indicative of an expansion of state power. While individuals might not be 
concerned about the loss of autonomy that comes from being subjected to 
more and more state scrutiny, it is unlikely that many would be comfortable 
with the suggestion that more surveillance inevitably brings with it more 
bureaucracy and bigger, more intrusive government.  
 
Of course, none of this should be taken as rejection of individualistic 
conceptions of privacy. Clearly, privacy is first and foremost a personal 
concern, and deserves to be treated as an individual right. Yet if we are to 
stem the growing tide of surveillance, civil libertarians and privacy advocates 
need to broaden their campaign of public education and do more to 
emphasise the political value of privacy. In particular, they must constantly 
remind government and the general public that in order for democracy to 
flourish, individuals must feel free to choose whom they associate with, 
whom they speak to, and who hears what they say, safe in the knowledge that 
such choices are free from routine scrutiny by the state. While it is true that 
privacy is one of the most difficult rights to define and appreciate, it is also 
one of the most important. Without privacy, many of the other rights that 
individuals and societies regard as fundamental are left even more vulnerable 
to the forces of right-scepticism, the demands of security, and the 
authoritarian instincts of over-zealous governments. If for no other reason, 
this should be enough for us to be worried about the spread of surveillance, 
and for the public to reject any suggestion that only those who have 
something to hide have anything to fear from technologies such as CCTV, 
DNA profiling, and data mining. Regardless of whether we have something 
to hide or not, in a world in which the possession and control of information 
is increasingly the basis of economic and political power, we should all be 
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demanding more privacy – not just to protect ourselves as individuals, but 
also to ensure that everyone is able to enjoy the rights and freedoms we have 
come to associate with life in modern, liberal democratic states. 
 
As a final point, it is perhaps worth returning to the role of academics in all 
of this. While it might be unreasonable to expect legal scholars, sociologists, 
and philosophers to take the lead in public debates on surveillance, there is 
little doubt that academics could do more to help improve the public’s 
understanding of the value of privacy. Given there is an urgent need for civil 
libertarians and privacy advocates to find a new ‘vocabulary of privacy’, any 
assistance on this front is likely to be gratefully received. Although there are 
still many more papers and books to be written on the subject of privacy, 
unless we find some way of capturing the public’s collective imagination and 
convincing ordinary people that privacy is something worth fighting for, 
there is a very real danger that it will soon become a thing of the past. 
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